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California Eviction Protections for
Victims of Domestic Violence: Additional
Protections or Additional Problems?
REBECCA LICAVOLI ADAMS*
Introduction
On January 1, 2011, California Code of Civil Procedure section
1161.3 (Section 1161.3) came into effect.' This statute provides an
affirmative defense for a victim of domestic violence against eviction
from a rental unit resulting from an act of domestic violence
committed against them.2 This issue potentially affects the lives of
an astonishing number of American women; research estimates
there are four million incidents of domestic violence in the United
States each year, and one in three women will experience domestic
violence in their lifetime.3 Domestic violence is a leading cause of
homelessness in major cities.4 Victims commonly lose their housing
because of lease provisions that allow eviction due to a violent or
criminal act occurring in their unit,5 or because of noise complaints
from other tenants.6 Some landlords evict because they fear being
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1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (West 2011).
2. Id.
3. Archana Nath, Survival or Suffocation: Can Minnesota's New Strangulation Law
Overcome Implicit Biases in the Justice System, 25 LAW & INEQ. 253, 256 (2007).
4. See generally U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA CITIES, 75 (2001), available at http:// www.usmayors.org/
ucsm/hungersurvey/2001/hungersurvey200l.pdf.
5. See generally Kristen M. Ross, Eviction, Discrimination, and Domestic Violence: Unfair




held liable if an abuser were to harm a neighboring tenant.7 Many
landlords simply do not want the violence, hassle, noise, or
complaints that can come with renting to domestic violence victim.
After a victim is evicted, she may have difficulty finding a new
rental due to credit issues or a criminal history directly relating to
the violence against her.8  However, Section 1161.3 prohibits
landlords from evicting victims for acts of violence committed
against them, and allows victims to raise Section 1161.3 as a defense
to an unlawful detainer action.9
However, it is not yet clear how the court will interpret many of
the provisions of Section 1161.3. After analyzing the statute and
possible interpretations of the provisions, it is clear that Section
1161.3 may not actually protect victims in the way advocates expect.
Some statutory provisions lack an understanding of the nature of
domestic violence; for example, the statute presumes a victim will be
able to keep the batterer from visiting the home.10 Other provisions
provide exceptions to the statute that will drastically decrease the
number of victims benefiting from Section 1161.3. As a result, the
statute may actually cause more harm than good for victims dealing
with housing issues. Advocates should be aware of these potential
problems, and pay heed to traditional and proven strategies in
assisting clients with eviction issues.
It is important to have a general understanding of domestic
violence to appreciate the housing issues victims face, and the
limitations of Section 1161.3. In Part I, I will provide an overview of
domestic violence, including common myths and information on
victim behavior. In Part II, I will provide an overview of the housing
issues victims face. In Part III, I will analyze Section 1161.3, offer
suggestions on how California courts could interpret the provisions,
and discuss problems victims might face when they attempt to use
the statute's defense. In Part IV, I will offer recommendations about
traditional and proven strategies that may better serve the needs of
victims facing eviction.
7. Ross, supra note 5.
8. See Eliza Hirst, Note, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: Disparate
Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 131, 133 (2003).
9. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(e) (West 2011).
10. see MARY ANN DUTrON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN 40
(1992).
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I. An Overview of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence, also referred to as intimate partner violence,
took root in the social, political, and economic systems of patriarchal
societies emphasizing male dominance, power, and control over
women.11 Domestic violence is commonly defined as a pattern of
coercive behavior that includes the physical, sexual, economic,
emotional, and psychological abuse of one person by another.12 The
abuser is often attempting to achieve and maintain power and
control over his partner.13 Generally, domestic violence occurs
between people that have or had an intimate, romantic partnership,
regardless of whether they are married or have ever lived together. 4
Although domestic violence occurs in all types of intimate
relationships, most victims of intimate partner violence are women;
some research reports that up to eighty-five percent of victims are
women.15
Although victims themselves come from all walks of life, their
experiences with abuse can be remarkably similar.16  Batterers
engage in physical abuse, including kicking, punching, and hitting,
or in sexual abuse or rape.17 A victim may suffer financial abuse,
where the abuser controls all household money, or be coerced into
acquiring debt that destroys the victim's credit.18 Sometimes the
most damaging violence is emotional or psychological abuse.
11. See generally Karla M. Digirolamo, Symposium, Myths and Misconceptions About
Domestic Violence, 16 PACE L. REV. 41, 43-44 (1995); R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P.
Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of Marital Violence, 2 Victimology 426 (1978)
(reprinted in LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS
OF OPPRESSION 185, 186 (Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1994)) (stating that
domestic violence is "a form of behaviour which has existed for centuries as an
acceptable, and, indeed, a desirable part of a patriarchal family system within a
patriarchal society").
12. Digirolamo, supra note 11, at 44.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28(3) (West
1997) (these statutes provide examples of the different types of relationships in which
domestic violence occurs).
15. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000). Because of these statistics, I generally refer to the victim
using female pronouns and descriptors in this Note, and to the batterer using masculine
pronouns. Domestic violence does occur in all types of relationships, and even a male
can be victimized by a female batterer. The protections in Section 1161.3 are available to
both male and female victims.




Domestic violence is a crime of control.19 To gain this control,
abusers will systematically destroy their partners' sense of self-
worth and self-esteem. 20 The goal of this behavior is to instill fear in
the victim, often isolating them from friends, family and the
community, leaving the victim with nowhere to turn for help.21
After repeated incidents of abuse, victims become incapable of
realizing that there is an alternative to the abusive environment, or
find attempts to secure assistance largely unsuccessful. 22  Most
victims are suffering from repeated incidents of abuse over a period
time.23
To understand the housing issues that victims face, it is
important to be familiar with other common problems that are
related to intimate partner violence. In the following sections, I will
address some of these problems, such as the legal response to
domestic violence. I will also counter the common myths that
surround women and domestic violence, and look at the experience
of the often forgotten victims of intimate partner violence - the
children.
A. The Legal Response to Domestic Violence: Past and Present
For much of history, society did not see domestic violence as a
social problem. Until the late nineteenth century, husbands were
legally permitted to physically "chastise" their wives. 24 By the end
of the 1800s, most states had criminalized wife beating, but courts
19. See John C. Nelson et al., Domestic Violence in the Adult Years, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 28, 29 (2005).
20. See Digirolama, supra note 11, at 45.
21. Id. at 46.
22. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 72 (3d ed.
2009) (explaining her theory of Learned Helplessness; when a repeatedly abused woman
realizes that she cannot control the violence in her life, she becomes psychologically
trapped in her relationship, unable to escape the abuse). Although most scholars believe
that Walker's theories adequately describe some battered women, not all victims display
this learned helplessness. However, though some women do actively seek help to escape
their batterers, their attempts are often unsuccessful, due to ineffective and inadequate
social services, or batterers' attempts to sabotage their efforts. Whether a victim is
psychologically paralyzed, or is unable to secure the assistance she needs to escape the
abuse, the result is the same; she is stuck in a violent relationship. See LEE H. BOWKER,
ENDING THE VIOLENCE 62, 75, 87 (1986) and LEE H. BOWKER, BATTERED WOMEN'S
PROBLEMS ARE SOCIAL, NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL IN CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE 154 (Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993).
23. See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 567 (2007).
24. Nath, supra note 3, at 257.
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did not treat domestic violence as a true social crime.25 Instead,
domestic violence was seen as a private family matter that courts
should not be involved in.2 6 Police rarely arrested the abuser in
domestic dispute; rather, the police told the abuser to walk around
the block to "cool off" before returning home.27
Despite law enforcement's slow reaction, the legal response
began to change in the 1970s. This was largely the result of a
grassroots movement from community domestic violence
advocates.28 This effort focused not only on establishing shelters and
services for victims of domestic violence, but also on increasing
government funding of community services and lobbying to gain
protection for women through the legal system.29 As a result of
intensive political participation, civil protection orders became more
available to victims in many states during the late 1970s, and many
jurisdictions adopted more aggressive arrest and prosecution
policies against perpetrators of domestic violence.30 Over time,
attorneys and advocates developed innovative legal strategies, such
the use of state and federal fair housing laws to address issues of
housing evictions.3' State and federal statutes addressing domestic
violence and the legal strategies that advocates use to protect victims
are not immune to criticism. Yet they can be seen as examples of the
progression from society's view of domestic violence as a private
family matter, to a crime for which the state's legal intervention is
appropriate.
B. Confronting and Perpetuating Myths of Domestic Violence:
Victim Behaviors
In the past several decades, law enforcement and the broader
legal system have shown an increased commitment to providing
services and protection to victims of domestic violence. However,
there are still dangerously prevalent myths surrounding victims of
domestic violence. These stereotypes prevent proper responses to
25. Nath, supra note 3, at 258; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating As
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2130 (1996).
26. See Nath, supra note 3, at 258.
27. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1662 (2004).
28. Id. at 1666.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1667.
31. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims
of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 377, 381 (2003).
intimate partner violence from the community and individuals in
the legal system. 32 A pervasive and persistent myth is that victims
somehow cause the violence against them, and that if the
relationship were really hurting them, they could always leave the
abusive relationship. 33
i. Remaining in the Relationship
Perhaps the most damaging myth surrounding domestic
violence is that a victim would simply leave the abusive relationship
if the violence were truly "bad."34 Since women choose not to leave,
many continue to believe they should not be afforded any special
legal "privileges," including protective housing laws. In reality,
victims may stay in the relationship for a variety of pragmatic
reasons; financial dependence on the abuser, fear that the abuser will
hurt her or keep her children from her if she tries to leave, or simply
because she has no other place to go.35 Due to psychological abuse,
victims may believe that they are powerless to stop the abuse and
that there is no escape from the relationship. 36 Additionally, the
abuser has likely isolated the victim from friends and family, so the
victim may not have anyone available to help, or to attempt to dispel
this alarming thinking.37
ii. Fear of Separation Abuse
Many victims have a frightening and valid reason for staying in
an abusive relationship. More often than not, their abuser has likely
threatened to harm the victim if the victim tries to leave. The abuser
often becomes most violent and dangerous when the victim decides
to leave or does leave the relationship.38 It is not uncommon for
abusers to use threats to attempt to keep their victim from leaving;
he may say that he or the police will take her kids from her, that she
will get arrested too, or that he will damage her property or kill her,
32. Nath, supra note 3, at 259-60.
33. See Melanie Frager Griffith, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 161-62 (1995).
34. See generally WALKER, supra note 22.
35. See Kit Kinports, Symposium, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the
Critics of Battered Women's Self-Defense, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 168 (2004).
36. Id.; WALKER, supra note 22, at 72.
37. See Kinports, supra note 35.
38. Id. at 158; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991).
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the pets, or the children, or he may violently and physically attempt
to keep her from leaving.39 Statistically, the violence, commonly
referred to as separation assault or separation abuse, escalates when
the victim decides to leave, and often after she does actually leave.40
This strong motivation for a victim to stay in an abusive relationship
is distressingly common. One study found that seventy-three
percent of battered women requesting emergency medical care were
injured by the abuser after leaving him.41 Another study showed
that at least half of women who leave abusive relationships are
followed, harassed and attacked by their abusers.42 Because of this,
deciding to stay in the relationship may be a victim's practical
decision to preserve her safety. With this information, it is easier to
understand why a victim may continue allowing her abuser to
return home, despite facing possible eviction.
iii. Recantation of Allegations of Abuse and Returning to the
Batterer
Recantation is one of the most common victim behaviors and
one of the most difficult to understand. In this situation, law
enforcement has become involved in the abusive relationship, and
the victim has initially cooperated and been forthcoming with police
and prosecutors, then, the victim suddenly recants earlier testimony
of abuse. 43 The victim may claim that they invented the abuse, or
simply refuse to testify.44 The victim often returns to her abuser, a
fact that is astonishing to people who believe that with the help of
law enforcement, the victim finally had her "ticket out" of the
relationship. Understandably, this causes advocates, courts, judges,
and law enforcement incredible amounts of frustration, and any
sympathy or empathy towards the victim diminishes. This
frustration is reflected in the provisions of many statutes designed to
provide protection to survivors of abuse. For example, victims can
lose the eviction protections provided by Section 1161.3 if they
39. Shannon Selden, The Practice of Domestic Violence, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 25
(2001).
40. Id.
41. Sarah M. Buel, Putting Forfeiture to Work, 43 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1295, 1343 (2010).
42. See Mahoney, supra note 38, at 64.
43. See Jay A. Abarbanel, Comment, In Light of Crawford v. Washington and the
Difficult Nature of Domestic Violence Prosecutions, Maryland Should Adopt Legislation Making
Admissible Prior Acts of Domestic Violence in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 U. BALT. L.
REV. 467, 471-72 (2010).
44. Id.
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continue to allow their abuser to visit or return to their home.45 Yet,
this is an incredibly common behavior; studies estimate that eighty
to ninety percent of victims will recant at some point.46 Victims
recant for many different reasons: they may have been confronted
with the financial reality of living without the abuser, received
threats from the abuser that the victim does not feel they can be
protected from, or she may want the children to continue to have a
relationship with the abuser.47 Recanting and remaining in the
relationship may be frustrating victim behavior, but for many
women, it is the result of a calculated decision, based on what she
knows about their abuser, to manage the violence in their life and
ensure their safety.48
C. Children and Domestic Violence
Children are the often forgotten victims of domestic violence.
Aside from emotional and possible physical damage to children, if a
victim is evicted due to domestic violence, her children also become
homeless. When victims are physically or sexually abused by their
partners, children are at risk of psychological damage from
witnessing the assault.49  Children may suffer from accidental
injuries in attempts to stop abuse, or by being in the vicinity of
abuse.50 Some research indicates that children who witness domestic
violence may engage in violent behavior as adults.51
Some victims may want nothing more than to separate
completely from their abuser. When children are involved,
however, achieving a separation is complex. The victim usually
cannot achieve a clean break; in most cases, courts will not allow it.
Generally, courts will allow the abuser to have some contact with his
children, unless there is evidence of child abuse.52
Statutory and judicial decisions that create difficulties for
45. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(b)(1)(A) (West 2011).
46. Abarbanel, supra note 43.
47. See Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justicefor Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 368 (1996).
48. See generally Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1232 (1993).
49. Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use
and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 83--84 (2001).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Amy B. Levin, Comment, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: How Should Judges
Apply the Best Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and Visitation Cases Involving
Domestic Violence? 47 UCLA L. REV. 813, 830 (2000).
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victims also create issues for their children. In some jurisdictions,
children may be removed from an otherwise fit parent and placed in
foster care when there has been domestic abuse. 53 Because of the
myths surrounding domestic violence, many individuals commonly
blame the victim for their plight, but most will admit that children
are truly innocent victims that need protection from our legislators
and courts. However, the way to protect children is to protect their
victimized mothers as well.54
In light of this information, it is easy to comprehend why a
woman may stay with or return to her abuser. There is a large body
of research dating back several decades supporting this
understanding of the nature of domestic violence relationships.55
53. See Weithorn, supra note 49, at 29; The "Failure to Protect" Working Group,
Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 849, 854-56 (2000) (citing the policies of child protective services to remove
children from domestic violence victims on the basis of "neglect", i.e., "failure to protect"
the children from exposure to the domestic violence, without providing appropriate
services to the victims or children).
54. See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER & JEFFREY L. EDLESON, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF
WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A CALL FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUENCIES 1994, available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/
documents/wingsp/wingsp.html (last visited August 21, 2011).
55. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) cited with
approval in Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of
Battered Women's Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUis U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 170-75 (2004) (explaining
the BWS theory, criticisms of the theory, and discussing alternative theories about
battering relationships). In 1979, psychologist Walker introduced her theory of the
"Battered Woman Syndrome." Walker described the effects of intimate partner violence,
and observed many characteristics that victims share, such as low self-esteem and
passivity. Walker found that in many relationships that involve abuse, there is a "cycle
of violence" that batterers follow; a tension building stage, an acute battering incident,
followed by loving apologies and promises that it will never happen again. Walker set
forth a theory of learned helplessness; as a result of physical and psychological abuse,
victims eventually learn that they cannot control the violence, and believes it is
unavoidable, and that there is no escape from the relationship. As a result of the
manipulative and abusive efforts of her batterer, a woman becomes literally trapped by
her own mind and her abuser is likely to have isolated her from friends and family, so
she may not have anyone around to help, or to attempt to dispel this alarming thinking.
Walker's influential work had an effect in the courts as well; it was very commonly used
to support a self-defense claim for victims that had hurt or killed their abusers. The use
of Battered Woman Syndrome in the court has fallen out of popularity, and is criticized
because it implies that victims have an illness, and that it may not accurately describe the
experience of all abused women. Despite this, Walker's theories have provided a helpful
framework in understanding many women's experience of domestic violence, and they
remain influential in the field. Other theories explain that some women do not display
the behaviors as explained by Walker, however, they are still essentially trapped in
battering relationships. Some researchers explain that battered women do in fact seek
help, but services are unavailable, or her batterer intentionally sabotages any efforts she
makes to leave the relationship. See EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATIERED
9
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Despite this understanding, there is a substantial and fundamental
misunderstanding of the effects of intimate partner violence, and the
common behavior of victims in the legal system. Victims will not
receive proper support or protection from law enforcement as long
as this misunderstanding persists. Strong legislative intervention is
needed to address many domestic violence issues. Specifically,
intervention in the eviction protection laws, which will be discussed
later, is important because housing is a particularly difficult issue for
victims. In the next section, I will discuss some of the specific,
housing related issues that victims deal with, and also the courts'
and legislators' responses to these issues.
II. Common Housing Issues for Victims of
Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a traumatic experience many women face
that does not stay within the confines of the relationship; the
violence can touch every part of her life. A devastating consequence
of domestic violence is the effect it has on a victim's housing
arrangements. Research has shown that fifty percent of homeless
women and children are escaping from domestic violence.56 Women
often become homeless as a result of their abuser's behavior and
violent incidents.57 Landlords, from both public and privately
owned housing, often have zero-tolerance violence policies enabling
them to evict an entire family if any violence or other crime occurs in
the unit.58 Some jurisdictions enact chronic nuisance laws allowing
them to evict a tenant if law enforcement has been called to a unit
over a certain number of times.59 An abuser's actions may offend
quiet enjoyment rules, or may place other tenants at risk, allowing a
landlord to evict. 60
Domestic violence can also cause difficulties for victims to
WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11-25
(1988). See generally Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women
Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217 (2003) (providing
discussion about the uses of Battered Woman Syndrome in the court).
56. K.J. WILSON, WHEN VIOLENCE BEGINS AT HOME: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING AND ENDING DOMESTIC ABUSE 204 (1st ed. 1997).
57. See generally U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 4; Hirst, supra note 8, at
132-33.
58. See Infra notes 78, 86 and accompanying text.
59. See generally Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic
Nuisance Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1181-82 (2008).
60. See Ross, supra note 5, at 251.
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qualify for rental housing. Although violence may escalate to a point
when fleeing a home is necessary for a victim's safety, long-term
leases may cause victims to continue living in misery.61 Women
often are married to and live with their batterers; when they reach
the point of leaving the relationship, they may have difficulty
removing the abuser from the shared household.62
A. Chronic Nuisance Laws
Generally, chronic nuisance laws are generally city policies that
impose fines on property owners based on the number of times
police services are called to their property. 63 The purpose of these
laws is to recover the costs of providing excessive police services.64
However, chronic nuisance laws increase housing difficulties for
victims. These laws discourage victims who are homeowners, often
jointly with their abusers, from calling the police for help after or
during an abusive incident. Victims know they will receive a bill for
law enforcement services if they request assistance over the allotted
number of times. 65 Chronic nuisance laws are slightly different in
each jurisdiction, but in at least one jurisdiction, homeowners are
billed if law enforcement visits the dwelling more than three times in
a sixty day period. 66 This extra expense can devastate a family that
is already struggling financially.
Additionally, the bill can severely compromise a victim's safety;
her batterer likely did not want her to call the police, and incurring a
debt on top of this may serve as an excuse for another incident of
abuse.67 Police may even inform the victim in front of the abuser
that if they call for help again, they will be fined or evicted. 68 These
laws can have a greater impact on victims who rent their homes.
Landlords are required to abate the nuisance when they are fined
under these laws or risk facing financial penalties.69 Landlords
usually evict tenants who require constant police assistance to abate
61. See generally MELIAH SCHULTZMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HOUSING: A MANUAL TOOLKIT FOR CALIFORNIA ADVOCATES 49
(2009), available at http://nhlp.org/files/NHLP%20Domestic%20Violence%20&%20
Housing%20Manual.pdf.
62. Id.
63. Fais, supra note 59, at 1181.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1199-2000.
66. Id. at 1190.
67. Id. at 1202.
68. Id. at 1181.
69. Fais, supra note 59, at 1201.
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this nuisance. Some of the statutes actually require that the landlord
evict the tenant, or else landlords risk losing their rental dwelling
permit.70 Moreover, the statutes seemingly encourage landlords to
carefully screen potential tenants, and to reject them if they believe
the prospective tenant may increase police activity on the property.71
Legislators purportedly enacted chronic nuisance laws to target
homes where repeated drug-related activity occurs.72 Most of the
statutes exempt law enforcement visits that result from crimes
committed by a stranger.73 However, there are examples of chronic
nuisance laws that were enacted with domestic violence in mind.
For example, when Coaldale, Pennsylvania enacted a chronic
nuisance ordinance, a reporter summarized the public discussion by
stating:
It's always disheartening for police officers to get calls that a
boyfriend is beating up a girlfriend, and then the girlfriend drops
the charges within a few days. It's more frustrating when the
offenders repeat the process over and over.... In addition, it's a
big waste of taxpayers' dollars when police have to respond to
nuisance calls and then to court without the benefit of cooperation
from those who complained in the first place.74
The local newspaper in Coaldale reported that the Chair of the
Council Police Committee stated that the committee's actual intent
in supporting the chronic nuisance ordinance "was to target victims
of domestic violence who refuse to 'follow through' with the
prosecution of their partners." 75 Fortunately, other jurisdictions
exhibit an understanding of domestic violence and the unique
difficulty that victims face under these ordinances by expressly
exempting domestic violence from their purview.76 Otherwise, these
ordinances usually do not make any exceptions for domestic
violence,7 such as the Pittsburg, Pennsylvania's 8 and Lancaster,
70. Id. at 1181-82.
71. Id. at 1195.
72. Id. at 1185.
73. Id. at 1188.
74. Ron Gower, Police Calls: Responsibility Will Be Required in Coaldale, TIMES NEWS,
Mar. 13, 2006, at 1.
75. Fais, supra note 59, at 1191.
76. Id. at 1223-24.
77. There does not appear to be any mention of domestic violence within any city's
ordinance. However, in at least one jurisdiction, a police reference guide explaining the
provisions of the ordinance does indicate that domestic violence calls are not considered
nuisance calls. Compare CITY OF CINCINNATI POLICE DEP'T, CPD PROCEDURE GOVERNING
CHRONIC NUISANCE PREMISES ORDINANCE ENFORCEMENT 2 (2006), available at
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California's statutes, 79 essentially ensuring housing difficulties for
victims in these jurisdictions.
B. Zero Tolerance or One Strike Violence Policies
Zero tolerance violence policies are common provisions in both
public and private housing leases. Public housing is government
subsidized for low-income tenants, and may consist of an entirely
government operated complex, or a private building which accepts
tenant vouchers and are partially funded by the government.80 In
1988, Congress added a zero tolerance policy to housing law as a
result of rampant drug activity in public housing. The policy stated
that every public housing lease would:
[p]rovide that any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of
the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the
tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.81
The Supreme Court upheld this policy in 2002, holding that housing
authorities have the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant
when a member of the household or a guest engages in drug-related
activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have
known, of the drug-related activity. 82
It is easy to imagine what such a policy could mean for victims
of domestic violence; they would face eviction every time they
suffered an incident of abuse, because they would be held
responsible for the criminal actions of the batterer. The victim may
be even less inclined to seek law enforcement protection, instead
preferring to suffer alone just to prevent the landlord from
discovering the situation. Advocates lobbied passionately against
this policy and its subsequent approval by the courts stating that
"[w]omen are not engaging in criminal activity when they are beaten
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/downloads/policepdfl5064.pdf (excluding
domestic violence calls from chronic nuisance tally), with Cincinnati, Ohio, Municipal
Code § 761-7 (2006), available at http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.
asp?pid=19996&sid=35 (no mention of domestic violence).
78. Fais, supra note 59, at 1190.
79. LANCASTER, CAL., CODE § 8.52 (2008).
80. Fais, supra note 59, at 1209, n.143.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(1)(6) (West 2006).
82. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
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or abused in their home. Victims of domestic violence are not trying
to threaten the health, safety or well-being of their neighbors."83
This problem was remedied in 2005 with the reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), in which Congress noted
the devastating impact this policy had on victims. 84  VAWA
expressly forbids housing authorities from applying the zero
tolerance policy to "criminal activity directly relating to domestic
violence ... engaged in by a member of a tenant's household or any
guest or other person under the tenant's control."85 It is relatively
easy for a victim to show that she suffered abuse by producing a
protective order, police report, or court record. Alternatively, she
can produce a signed affidavit from herself, an attorney, domestic
violence service provider, or a medical professional. 86 Additionally,
VAWA allows a landlord to bifurcate a lease to evict only the
abuser.87 However, landlords can still evict the victim when they
"can demonstrate an actual and imminent threat to other tenants."88
It is important to note that the VAWA protection only applies to
victims living in federally subsidized public housing; it does not
provide any protection for the vast numbers of victims in private
housing. Private leases often include a zero tolerance violence
policy, leaving a victim vulnerable to eviction if their partner
assaults them or destroys property.89 In many cases, landlords chose
to enact these policies for the protection of other tenants.90 In many
states, including California, "landlords are under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect tenants against foreseeable criminal acts of
third parties." 91 A landlord may evict a victim because of the
batterer's propensity to violence; even if the victim has ended the
83. Hirst, supra note 8, at 141.
84. 42 U.S.C.A. §14043e(4) (West 2006).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(9)(C)(i) (West 2006);
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(7)(D)(i) (West 2006).
86. Meliah Schultzman, Address to Domestic Violence Law class at UC Hastings,
(Oct. 19, 2010).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6)(B) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(9)(C)(ii) (West
2009); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(7)(D)(ii) (West 2011).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6)(E) (West 2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(9)(C)(v) (West
2009); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(7)(D)(v) (West 2011).
89. For an example of a typical zero tolerance crime policy, see Residential Lease for
the Enclave at Adobe Creek Apartment Complex, "Zero Tolerance Crime Policy" at 10
(on file with author). This lease for a private, corporate-owned complex located in
Petaluma, California provides; "Residents, any member of the Resident's household, or a
guest, invitee or other person under the control of the Residents shall not engage in
criminal activity ... on or near the Residential community or Leased Premises."
90. Ross, supra note 5, at 252.
91. Ross, supra note 5, at 252.
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relationship, the batterer may return to attack the victim, and may
harm other tenants in the process, thereby exposing the landlord to
liability. 92 Having a domestic violence victim in the building is a risk
many landlords are unwilling to take. Some states, including
California, enacted a defense to evictions in private housing, similar
to VAWA's protections, but many of these statutes do not offer
enough protection.93
C. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
Landlords can also be liable to other tenants for a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment.94 In California, absent an express
provision, tenants have an implied right to quiet enjoyment of the
premises in their leases. 95 If landlords believe that domestic violence
could breach this covenant, leading to liability to other tenants, they
may evict or refuse to rent to the victim in the first place.96 A
domestic assault or argument is likely to be noisy, and could make
other tenants fearful. Thus, a landlord may be unwilling to risk
potential liability, and instead choose to evict a tenant that has
suffered loud incidents of domestic violence.
D. Difficulties in Securing Housing
Financial abuse is a common type of domestic violence so
victims may also have trouble securing housing. A batterer often
takes control of household finances, and coerces the victim to run up
debt from unpaid bills or credit cards, destroying her credit rating
thereby making it difficult for the victim to be approved for a rental
property.97 Previous eviction proceedings may also appear on the
victim's credit report.98 Victims may also have criminal records as a
result of abuse. For example, victims may be arrested after an
assault when law enforcement is unable to determine the primary
aggressor.99 Sometimes victims may have criminal convictions
92. Id.
93. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3 (West 2011) (the statute provides
some protections against eviction, but also provides many exceptions); Infra n.111.
94. Ross, supra note 5, at 255.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Hirst, supra note 8, at 135.
98. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 14.
99. Michaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence As a Crime Against the State: The
Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 683 (1997). Hoctor explains
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because their abuser coerced them into criminal activity, or the
victims may have used drugs or alcohol to cope with their abuse. 00
These criminal convictions can potentially bar victims from renting.
E. Additional Housing Issues
A victim may face issues that are unrelated to eviction despite
having secured housing.. For example, a victim may have to relocate
to escape future abuse. However, she may have signed a long-term
rental agreement making her responsible for all rent due until the
end of the lease if she moves out early.101 Fortunately, California has
enacted Civil Code § 1946.7, which permits survivors of domestic
violence, sexual assault, or stalking, who have restraining orders or
police reports, to end their leases early without owing additional
rent.102 Under this statute, a victim is required to give a landlord a
written thirty-day notice of her intent to vacate, and the victim will
only be responsible for the final month's rent.103 The victim must
provide her landlord a restraining order or police report, dated
within the past sixty days, verifying the domestic violence.104 The
landlord must refund her security deposit in the same manner as if
she had completed the lease. 05 Unfortunately, many victims and
even some landlords do not know about this protection, which may
prevent victims from relocating to a safer place.106 Conversely, in
some instances the victim may wish to remain in her current home
and request that the court remove her abuser from the lease. 07
California law generally requires that the court name all parties to
the lease in an eviction action, which makes it nearly impossible to
that mandatory arrest provisions are becoming increasingly common in many
jurisdictions. These provisions require that police make an arrest in domestic disputes
when there is probable cause that an assault has occurred. Prior to these provisions,
officers had increased discretion, and would often refuse to make an arrest unless they
had actually seen the assault. Many believe that these provisions are necessary to protect
victims and increase batterer accountability, but an unintended result has been an rise in
the number of victim arrests. Although officers are supposed to determine the primary
aggressor in the dispute, victims that have engaged in self-defense behavior are often
arrested. Additionally, in some situations, officers are unable to identify the primary
aggressor, and simply arrest both parties.
100. Hirst, supra note 8, at 135.
101. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2 (West 1970).
102. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1946.7(d) (West 2008).
103. Id.
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7(b)(1)-(2) (West 2008).
105. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 36.
106. See Schultzman, supra note 86.
107. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 33.
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evict only the abuser in private housing.108 Typically, a victim's only
option is to seek a restraining order in which the judge requires the
abuser to move out of the home, commonly called a "kick-out
order." 109 This protection is given at the judge's discretion, and can
be contested by the abuser, which often leaves a victim with few
options to escape abuse without having to abandon her lease.110
A survey of the provisions discussed show that a victim of
domestic violence may have difficulties securing and retaining
housing. As discussed above, there are numerous reasons why a
landlord would not want to rent to a victim. Noisy or even visible
fights may scare other tenants. Prospective tenants likely do not
want to live in a complex where domestic violence takes place.
Landlords and other tenants may not want the police showing up on
a regular basis. In short, a landlord is more likely to choose tenants
without domestic violence issues even if they never articulate the
reasoning behind this preference. This can be especially difficult for
victims who live in areas with an affordable housing shortage, and
where competition for each unit is fierce. These difficulties have not
gone unnoticed by advocates, courts, and lawmakers, resulting in
state and federal laws that specifically provide protections to
victims. Additionally, state and federal fair housing and civil rights
laws have been used to protect the housing rights of victims. In the
following sections, I will discuss these laws and theories. I will show
that some are more effective than others, and some actually are more
harmful than beneficial.
108. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1164 (West 1885); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1166a (West
2005).
109. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6321 (West 1993).
110. See Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43, 52 (1989).
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III. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161.3:
A Solution or More Problems?
California has recently joined a growing number of states"'1 that
offers victims of domestic violence a defense to eviction in private
housing.112 The California statute became effective on January 1,
2011, and applies to leases entered into or renewed after that date.113
The statute prohibits a landlord from evicting a tenant or household
member based on an act of domestic violence, sexual assault, or
stalking if the victim has either a restraining order issued within the
past 180 days, or a police report of the eligible incident within the
past 180 days.114 The landlord is prohibited from evicting the victim
only if the perpetrator named in the protective order is not a tenant,
subtenant, lessee or sublessee of the unit, even if he is named in a
restraining order.115 The statute has exceptions that allow landlords
to proceed with eviction proceedings. For example, the landlord can
evict if the tenant has already used these protections once and
111. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-107.5(5)(c)(I) (2005); MINN. STAT. § 504B.205
(2000) (a landlord may not bar or limit a tenant "for calling for police or emergency
assistance in response to domestic abuse or any other conduct"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-
33(J) (2001) ("In any action for possession [for substantial violation by another person in
the unit or on the premises], it shall be a defense that the resident is a victim of domestic
violence."); 1985 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 45, Formal Op. No. 85-F15, 1985 N.Y. AG LEXIS 8
(refusal to rent to victims of domestic violence or requiring abused applicants to obtain a
divorce from the abuser violates the state human rights law because of the disparate
impact upon women); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580 (2004) (providing tenants with a
defense to eviction due to an act of domestic violence); WIs STAT. § 106.50(5m)(d) (2000)
("No claim that an individual's tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the safety of
other persons or would result in substantial damage to property may be based on the fact
that a tenant has been or may be the victim of domestic abuse."). Despite the numerous
statutes in several different states, there are not many cases, published or unpublished,
showing how courts interpret the protections contained in the statutes. A Washington
case, Indigo Real Estate Services v. Rousey, 151 Wash. App. 941, 945, 215 P.3d 977, 978
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009), does focus on a victim that relied upon the eviction protection
statute. The court noted that as soon as the landlord was informed of the statute, he
requested dismissal of the unlawful detainer action, which the court granted. This case
was the only reported case located that deals with the operation of these statutes. This
lack of case examples suggests that these actions simply do not make it to court, and if
so, generally do not move past the trial court level. Landlords, when confronted with the
law, may decide not to proceed with the eviction, or victims, unaware of the protections,
may simply move out when evicted. Nevertheless, advocates need to be aware of this
lack of history, and should be informed of the possible risks of relying on these types of
statutes.
112. See CAL. CIV PROC. CODE § 1161.3(a) (West 2011).
113. Id.
114. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1161.3(a)(1)(B)(2) (West 2011).
115. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1161.3(d) (West 2011).
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continues to allow the perpetrator to visit the property. 116
Additionally, the landlord can evict if he:
[r]easonably believes that the presence of the person against
whom the protection order has been issued or who was named in
the police report of the act .. . of domestic violence, sexual assault,
or stalking poses a physical threat to other tenants, guests ... or to
a tenant's right to quiet possession.117
However, the statute also requires the landlord to give a three-day
notice to the tenants to remedy the situation before evicting under
one of the exceptions. 118  This is not a "magic ticket" against
evictions; landlords can still evict victims for violating other
provisions of the lease. Landlords are only barred from evicting
based upon acts directly relating to domestic violence; such as for
excessive noise, or law enforcement visits to the home, or under a
zero tolerance violence policy. Although the statute applies to all
landlords, it is important to note that it mainly affects victims living
in private housing. Victims residing in federally subsidized public
housing can rely upon the protections in VAWA in addition to this
statute.119
Although undoubtedly an important step towards providing
critical protections that prevent housing issues for victims, 120 the
statute has several serious shortfalls that may make it an example of
good legislative intentions that increase difficulties for victims and
advocates.121
First, the statute denies eviction protection if the tenant
continues to invite the perpetrator to the premises. This clause in the
statute demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature
of domestic violence. It particularly causes difficulties for victims
with children, and sheds light on a clear contradiction in domestic
116. CAL. CIV. PROC.§ 1161.3(b)(1)(A) (West 2011).
117. CAL. CIV. PROC.§ 1161.3(b)(1)(B)(2) (West 2011).
118. CAL. CIV. PROC.§ 1161.3(b)(2) (West 2011).
119. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6) (West 2006).
120. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61.
121. See Schultzman, supra note 86. In 2005, California assembly member Rebecca
Cohn introduced AB 99, which extended the possible duration of restraining orders from
three years to five years. The bill passed and amended CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345. Some
advocates argue that although the amended reflected good intentions, the result was
actually a disservice to victims. Some advocates found that judges would actually only
grant restraining orders for a very short time, such as six months or a year when the
victim's requested an order for the full five years. Advocates speculate that judges were
hesitant to restrict the perpetrators civil liberty for a full five years; it simply seemed "too
long" compared to the former three-year maximum.
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violence law. Next, it is unclear what kind of showing a landlord
will have to make to prove that he or she believes the perpetrator
poses a threat to other tenants, or what constitutes a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment. A landlord could potentially evict a
tenant under this exception as he could prior to the enactment of the
statute. Next, the interpretation of the terms "tenant, subtenant,
lessee, or sublessee" could result in only a very small number of
victims relying on the statute for an affirmative defense to eviction,
since victims often live with an abusers that is included on the lease.
Additionally, the statute may preempt city housing ordinances that
provide greater protections to victims. 1 22 Finally, the statute can
become an illusory protection if these limitations prove accurate;
advocates and victims may rely upon the illusory protects at the
expense of other theories that have proven successful.
A. A Misunderstanding of Domestic Violence, Contradictions in
the Law, and Problems for Parents
Perhaps the most problematic portion of this statute is the
exception that allows landlords to evict if the tenant has used the
statute protection previously, and continues to allow the perpetrator
to visit the premises. 123 Courts, landlords, and even advocates find it
incredibly frustrating when a victim seems unwilling to help herself,
and continuously returns to a relationship with the abuser and
allows him to come back into her home. This frustration is
understandable, but the victim's behavior reflects the common cycle
of domestic violence.124 A victim of continuous abuse has been
isolated and manipulated into believing that she cannot survive on
her own. 12 5 A batterer will use manipulation to prey upon and
convince the victim to continue allowing the batterer into her
home.126 Instead, the law assumes that the victim has control over
her batterer's behavior, and that the batterer will not come to the
house without her invitation. Even if the victim is continuing to
allow the batterer to visit, it may be a calculated decision to avoid
separation abuse, or to continue receiving needed financial support
for herself and her children.127 The law does not reflect the true
122. Schultzman, supra note 86
123. See CAL. CIV. PROC.§ 1161.3(b)(1)(A) (West 2011).
124. See generally WALKER, supra note 55.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Dutton, supra note 48, at 368.
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complexity of a victim separating from her abuser, a process that can
take months, and is nearly impossible to complete in many
situations without support that is not often available. 128 A simple
housing statute provision cannot solve domestic violence, but it fails
to protect the protections it intends to when it is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the way abusive relationships
work.
Most scholars believe the only way to protect victims from
future abuse is a complete separation from her abuser.129 But what
about women who want to stay with their partners, and simply want
the violence to stop? "While their reasons may be emotional,
economic, religious, cultural, or child-centered, the reality is that a
substantial number of battered women have no intention of leaving
their partners."130  This statute contains provisions that punish
women who attempt to keep their families together. A landlord can
evict a victim if she reconciles with her partner, or works through
problems by having her partner come to her home.131 Many argue
that all of domestic violence law is designed upon the proposition
that women will sever ties with their abusers,132 and this housing
law reflects that goal. However, abusers convicted of domestic
violence are often sentenced to complete a rehabilitation program. 33
Batterer intervention programs are generally court-mandated
alternatives to incarceration, and provide counseling and education
in an attempt to stop a batterer's violent behavior towards his
partner.134 Although there is disagreement about the effectiveness of
these programs,135 courts continue to sentence batterers to this type
of treatment, reflecting the belief that in some cases, abusers can
change their violent behavior.136  The aforementioned housing
provision is a direct contradiction to this premise. It does not make
128. See Sharan K. Suri, Note, A Matter of Principle and Consistency: Understanding the
Battered Woman and Cultural Defenses, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 107, 128 (2000).
129. See generally Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 7 (2004).
130. Id. at 20.
131. See CAL. CIV. PROD. CODE § 1161.3(b)(1)(A) (West 2011).
132. See generally Goodmark, supra note 129 (explaining that protective orders,
mandatory arrest, and no drop policies are all reflective of the legal goal of separating
victims from their abusers).
133. See generally Amanda Dekki, Note, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for
State-Mandated Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases, 18
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 549 (2004).
134. Id. at 566.
135. Id. at 572-73.
136. Id. at 573.
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sense for an abuser to complete and follow a treatment program
whose goal is to keep a family together, if the family can be evicted
as soon as the recovering batterer returns home.
Alternatively, many victims want nothing more than to sever all
ties with their abusers, but cannot because they are the fathers of
their children. In the absence of child abuse, courts will generally
allow a father visitation with his children.137 This housing statute
presents a very practical problem for victims. An abuser may
continue to visit the home for countless reasons; picking up and
dropping off the kids, dropping off toys, diapers or other supplies,
having discussions with his ex-partner about children's medical or
school issues, or casual holiday visits. A landlord committed to
evicting a certain tenant could use these visits in an attempt to rebut
a victim's defense under the statute. It remains to be seen how
courts will interpret these situations.138  Ideally, advocates and
lawyers will attempt to educate the court about domestic violence
and parenting issues, and well-educated judges will not allow these
visits to result in homelessness for the victim. Considering the
historically uninformed treatment of domestic violence in the
courts,139 advocates and lawyers should be vigilant against attempts
by landlords to use the exceptions to the statute in this way.
B. Other Tenants: Danger and Breach of the Covenant of
Quiet Enjoyment
Under the statute, a landlord is able to evict if the batterer is
believed to be a danger to other tenants or their guests, or who
threatens another tenant's right to quiet enjoyment.140 With the
inclusion of this exception, it is tempting to ask what additional
protection this statute provides. In many cases, landlords evict
victims of domestic violence for these exact reasons; because
landlords are concerned about liability if the abuser's violence harms
other tenants or because an abusive relationship is noisy and
frightening for other tenants in the complex.141 Ideally the statute's
usefulness will arise from the presumption that landlords cannot
evict based upon an act of domestic violence, and will require a
stronger showing of danger to other tenants or interference to quiet
137. Levin, supra note 52.
138. See Schultzman, supra note 86.
139. See Griffith, supra note 33.
140. See CAL. CIv. PROD. CODE § 1161.3(b)(1)(B) (West 2011).
141. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61.
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enjoyment to rebut this presumption. Again, court treatment of
these issues remains to be seen, but some guidance can be inferred
from similar eviction proceedings.
Although these cases do not involve domestic violence,
California courts have held that landlords are under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect tenants against foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties. 142 These cases generally turn on
whether the perpetrator's actions were foreseeable to the landlord. 143
For example, in Madhani v. Cooper, the court found that one tenant's
repeated acts of assault and battery against another tenant were
sufficient to render a future attack reasonably foreseeable, and that a
reasonable landlord should have taken measures to prevent a future
attack.144 In this case, the court held that the landlord's knowledge
of a specific tenant's propensity of violence towards other tenants
led to a duty to remove that person from the premises. 145 It could
follow that a landlord will have notice of an abusers vicious
propensity if he continually batters his partner in a manner visible to
other tenants. Presumably, the landlord will have the duty to
remove him from the premises, even if it means evicting the
victim.1 46 However, other state courts have declined to find that an
abuser's violent behavior towards his partner to be an indication that
violence against other tenants is reasonably foreseeable. An analysis
of a specific perpetrator's danger to other tenants is going to rely
heavily upon the facts of that particular situation. 147 Case law in this
area is limited, California courts could find that domestic violence is
enough to show the "violent propensity" needed to make a future
attack on other tenants reasonably foreseeable. 148 Advocates need to
be aware of this possibility, and approach eviction cases under this
statute with the information needed to contradict this assumption.149
This may include evidence that the perpetrator "target[s] specific
142. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212 (Cal. 1993)
(providing that a landlord has a "duty to take reasonable steps to secure common areas
against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of
such precautionary measures").
143. Ross, supra note 5, at 253.
144. See Madhani v. Cooper, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778, 780 (2003).
145. Id. at 781.
146. See, e.g., Williams v. Gorman, 520 A.2d 761, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(offering a general example of a court's treatment of this issue).
147. See Ross, supra note 5, at 253 (discussing an example of a holding that was very
dependent on the specific facts of the case).
148. See generally Ross, supra note 5.
149. Anne C. Johnson, Note, From House to Home: Creating A Right to Early Lease
Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1864 (2006).
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intimates or family members, not random individuals."1 50
The statute also provides an exception to the eviction defense if
the landlord reasonably believes that the presence of the person
named in the restraining order or police report will interfere with
another tenant's right to quiet possession. 51 In other words, a
landlord can rebut the tenant's defense to eviction, if the acts of
domestic violence interfere with other tenant's quiet enjoyment of
his home.152 It is not difficult to imagine the types of disturbances
neighbors may report: screaming and shouting, breaking glass or
furniture, and slamming doors frequently accompany family
assaults.153 Additionally, violence does not always remain confined
to a victim's own apartment, and viewing assaults in common areas
of the complex can be frightening to other tenants. Case law is clear
that:
[m]inor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable
breaches of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. To be
actionable, the landlords act or omission [by not taking action
against the tenant causing the disturbances] must substantially
interfere with a tenants' right to use and enjoy the premises for the
purposes contemplated by the tenancy.154
It is far from clear whether these common disturbances that
accompany domestic violence are more than "minor annoyances." 5 5
Although not directly on point, other state and federal courts have
found that continuous loud music almost every night could
constitute a constructive eviction of another tenant if the landlord
did not remedy the noise.156  Another decision suggests that
screaming and slamming doors throughout the night resulting in
numerous complaints could be a legitimate reason to evict a
tenant.157 These examples suggest that noise and fear from domestic
150. Johnson, supra note 149.
151. CAL. CIV. PROD. CODE § 1161.3(b)(1)(B) (West 2011).
152. See generally Ross, supra note 5, at 255-56.
153. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford's Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of
Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2006) (offers an account of an extremely violent,
noisy, and destructive incident of domestic violence).
154. Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 839 (Ct. App. 2005).
155. Ross, supra note 5, at 255-56.
156. See Blackett v. Olanoff, 358 N.E.2d 817, 818 (Mass. 1977).
157. See Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1041 (6th Cir.
2001). The apartment complex, a nonprofit organization providing housing to disabled
individuals, evicted Groner due to excessive noise, including screaming and slamming
doors at all hours. Groner was evicted, and challenged his eviction under the Fair
Housing Act. The court held that the complex had met their burden in providing
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violence may create actionable breaches.
It is also unclear what type of evidence landlords will have to
present to prove their "reasonable belief" that a breach of other
tenant's quiet enjoyment will occur if he or she does not evict the
victim.1 58 Obviously this remains to be seen in the court's treatment
of specific cases brought under the statement. Landlords will likely
be successful using this exception unless victims present substantial
evidence that the perpetrator will not be returning to the premises,
or that any noise from her apartment was an isolated incident. This
may be a difficult showing, which will further reduce the protection
the statute can provide.
C. Denial of Protection for Victims
Section 1161.3(a)(B)(2) provides that a victim can only use this
defense to eviction if "the person against whom the protection order
has been issued or who was named in the police report of the act or
acts of domestic violence . .. is not a tenant of the same dwelling unit
as the tenant or household member."159 This appears to exempt all
victims that have signed a lease with their abuser. In addition to the
difficulty a victim may have removing her abuser from the lease,160
she may also be evicted from her home because the statute does not
appear to protect victims in this situation.
Section 1161.3(d) provides that "for the purposes of this section,
'tenant' means tenant, subtenant, lessee, or sublessee," clearly
covering all express and contractual landlord-tenant relationships.161
This implies that a victim who allows her abuser to move in, without
retaining express permission from her landlord or executing a new
lease, will still be able to use the affirmative defense to eviction
because her abuser is not an official tenant of her unit.162 However,
California courts have held that a landlord-tenant relationship can be
implied in the absence of a formal lease, by consent and acceptance of
rent.163 Whether consent and acceptance of rent creates a landlord-
accommodations required for protection of disabled persons under the Act, before
evicting Groner, and approved summary judgment for the complex. This allows the
inference that the complex was within their rights to evict an excessively noisy tenant
that had numerous complaints from neighbors.
158. See CAL. CIV. PROD. CODE § 1161.3(b)(1)(B) (West 2011).
159. CAL. CIV. PROD. CODE § 1161.3 (a)(2) (West 2011).
160. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1946.7(d) (West 2008).
161. CAL. CIV. PROD. CODE § 1161.3(d) (West 2011).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Getz v. City of W. Hollywood, 284 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633-34 (Ct. App.
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tenant relationship depends on the particular circumstances of each
case.164 A landlord could argue that a victim is not entitled to the
affirmative defense because he knew the abuser had moved in, and he
accepted the rent check from the abuser several times. If the court
accepts this argument, the protections of this statute may not apply to
victims that are informally living with their partners.
D. City Ordinances: More Protective, But Possibly Preempted
Since there was not a statewide affirmative defense to eviction
for domestic violence victims prior to January 2011, some cities in
California enacted local ordinances creating this protection. An
example of one is San Francisco Administrative Code Section 37.9.165
This ordinance provides an affirmative defense when the eviction is
based on an act of domestic violence against the tenant.166 To prove
abuse under this ordinance; a victim can provide a restraining order
or police report (similarly to Section 1161.3), but also can use a
statement from law enforcement, a social worker, or counselor.167 If
the victim has a restraining order, she can apply this defense as often
as necessary, otherwise, she may only use the defense once in a five-
year period.168 The ordinance does not specify any exceptions to this
defense, unlike Section 1161.3, providing greater protection to
victims. It is unclear whether Section 1161.3 will preempt this
ordinance, 169 but it is possible that advocates and victims will no
longer be able to rely upon the protections in the administrative
code. An exhaustive choice of law analysis is needed to provide a
definitive answer to this question, but that is beyond the scope of
this Note; however, advocates should be aware of this possibility.
1991) (explaining that a tenancy relationship can be created in the absence of a formal
lease, if the landlord accepts the rent from and knows that an individual is residing in the
home without being added to the lease).
164. Getz, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34.





169. See Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential, State and
Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2004)
(explaining the three basic ways a state statute can preempt a county ordinance or
regulation: (1) by express statutory language; (2) by inferring state intent to completely
occupy the field; or (3) by operational conflict, where partial preemption may occur if the
effect of local law would conflict with the application of an applicable state statute. It is
unclear how this analysis will affect section 1161.3 and S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.9.).
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E. What Section 1161.3 Could Mean for Victims
It is important to recognize that any official, legislative
recognition of the housing difficulties of domestic violence is a
welcomed step forward. Despite these possible limitations, Section
1161.3 can provide protections for victims, as long as advocates and
legal professionals are conscientious and careful when relying on
this affirmative defense to a victim eviction. It is important to make
sure that a client meets the criteria of the statute by not residing with
her abuser or engaging in activity that could be construed as
allowing the abuser to visit her property. Also, advocates should
pay careful attention to court interpretation of some of the
provisions of the statute as cases become available. Specifically, the
court will need to determine who is a "tenant" of the victim's
dwelling under the statute. An abuser that has been staying with the
victim for several months could be classified as a tenant under the
statue, even if he has not signed the lease. 170 It is also unclear how
landlords will have to show their "reasonable belief" that an abuser
may be a danger to other tenants, or interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of other tenants.171 Also, it is unclear how courts will
determine what constitutes a tenant allowing a perpetrator to visit
the premises, and what victim behaviors will allow the landlord to
use this exception.172 Court interpretation of the statute will be the
key to whether Section 1161.3 will provide actual and realistic
protections to most victims.
In the meantime, Section 1161.3 can prove dangerous for victims
if they rely upon the statute to prevent evictions, only to find out
that they do not fit the specific criteria or that their landlord can
successfully apply one of the exceptions to the defense. Victims,
advocates, and legal professionals should not rely upon this statute
to provide definitive protection for victims facing eviction
proceedings at the expense of developing other more traditional
strategies. In the next section, I will describe several of these
traditional strategies that can be utilized for victims that may not
benefit from the protections of Section 1161.3.
170. See Getz v. City of W. Hollywood, 284 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633-34 (Ct. App. 1991).
171. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(b)(1)(B) (West 2011).
172. Id.
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IV. Not to be Forgotten: Fair Housing Law Remedies
and Traditional Advocacy
While Section 1161.3 may prove to be an effective solution,
domestic violence survivors facing eviction and homelessness
should not rely on it until the courts have interpreted the provisions
of the statute. In the meantime, advocates and victims should
continue to use traditional advocacy, and innovative legal strategies
that have been successful in courts, such as sex discrimination claims
under federal and state fair housing laws. These theories can be
effective for residents of both public and private housing, but will
likely be most useful in private housing since residents of public
housing are protected under federal law.173
A. Sex Discrimination Theories Under Fair Housing Statutes
Landlords of private housing complexes are required to comply
with the Federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), which states that
landlords cannot "refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin." 74 In California, the Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FEHA") also applies, and provides the same general protections,175
along with several additional safeguards to tenants, including
additional protected groups, and a slightly more expansive
definition of housing.176 "Victims of domestic violence" is not an
expressly protected class under either law, but this group may still
be able to use these laws to challenge evictions as a result of acts of
violence committed against it.177 This is a relatively new and novel
approach, but it has been used successfully to challenge evictions
173. 42 U.S.C.A. §1437d(l)(6) (West 2006).
174. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a) (West 1988).
175. See CAL. GOv'T. CODE § 12955 (West 2010).
176. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 40. Under FEHA, landlords are prohibited from
discriminating against the same protected groups contained in FHA, and also are
prohibited from discrimination based on ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, and
source of income. Additionally, FEHA typically applies to all types of housing that is not
owner occupied, while FHA exempts owner occupied complexes with less than four
units, and single family homes, unless the owner owns more than three houses at any
time, and for certain private club housing. Both FEHA and FHA provide some
exemptions to senior housing, and housing owned by religious groups.
177. Id. at 41.
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using sex discrimination theories in state and federal courts. 178
Disparate impact and disparate treatment are the two major sex
discrimination theories that can be used to challenge evictions and
other housing discrimination theories against victims.179 These
theories can be claimed together or separately.o80
i. Disparate Impact Theory
Under disparate impact theory, a gender-neutral policy that can
be statistically proven to have a greater negative impact on women
than on men constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. It is not
necessary to demonstrate that the landlord intended to discriminate
on the basis of sex in adopting the policy.181 This theory is especially
effective in challenging housing policies, such as zero tolerance
violence lease provisions, when a victim has been evicted due to her
abuser committing a criminal act of domestic violence towards
her. 18 2  Advocates can argue that because these policies have a
disparate impact on domestic violence victims, and most of the
victims of domestic violence are women, these policies have
disparate impact on women.183 An example of a case that involved a
disparate impact theory can be found in United States v. CBM
Group.184 In this case, Tiffanie Alvera was assaulted by her husband
in her public housing unit in Oregon in 2001, and was subsequently
evicted pursuant to a zero tolerance violence policy.185 The hearing
officer found that "the landlord's policy of evicting the victim as well
as the perpetrator of an incident of violence between household
members had a disparate impact based on sex, due to the
disproportionate number of female victims of domestic violence." 86





183. Id. at 45.
184. See United States v. CBM Group, HUDALJ 10-99-0538-8, at 1 (Apr. 13, 2001). For
more information about this case, see also, Alvera v CBM, Inc. ACLU, available at
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/alvera-v-cbm-group-inc-et-al.
185. Id. (Tiffanie was not a resident of traditional public housing, but did receive a
rent subsidy under a state program, so her case was heard in a Housing and Urban
Development hearing. Note that this case was in 2001, before the 2005 VAWA remedy
became available).
186. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 45 (case settled before reaching a state or federal
court).
29
ii. Disparate Treatment Theory
A victim may also have a claim based on a disparate treatment
theory if she can prove that she was treated differently than similarly
situated male tenants, or that the housing provider's action stemmed
from gender-based stereotypes about battered women.187  For
example, a woman may successfully assert this theory if she is
evicted because she was a victim of violence in her apartment, and a
male neighbor is also attacked in his apartment but is not evicted. 88
This theory can also be used if the eviction is not as a result of
violence. For example, a victim may assert this theory if she is
evicted due to noisy fighting associated with domestic violence,
while a male neighbor who has similar loud arguments is not
evicted.189 Women can also raise disparate treatment claims when
landlords make stereotypical remarks about battered women based
on sex.190 In Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, the petitioner-victim was
evicted from her apartment after her husband violently assaulted,
and she filed a lawsuit on a sex discrimination theory.191 During
deposition, her landlord said that she believed female victims of
domestic violence are equally responsible for the abuse, and that she
did not believe Mrs. Bouley was a victim because she did not seem
concerned about her husband or in shock.192 Mrs. Bouley argued
that her eviction was due to impermissible stereotypical beliefs
regarding the characteristics of an innocent female victim of
domestic violence.193 The court found that Mrs. Bouley stated a
claim for sex discrimination under FHA, and the case settled shortly
there after.194
Sex Discrimination claims under FEHA and FHA are a
relatively recent approach to protecting the housing rights of
victims, but the results so far have been promising. Scholars and
advocates have heralded these approaches.195 Advocates should
continue to file claims of sex discrimination in housing cases
involving victims of domestic violence to fully develop this area of
187. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 45
188. See generally CBM Group, supra note 18.
189. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 43.





195. State and Local Housing Protections for Domestic Violence Victims Gaining
Momentum, NAT'L HOUSING L. PROJECT (Sept. 2008), http://nhlp.org/node/626.
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fair housing. Advocates and legal professionals should not use
Section 1161.3 as an excuse to abandon these efforts that appear
promising in protecting victims not only in California, but in other
states that do not have statutory schemes similar to Section 1161.3.
B. Traditional Advocacy
Though not as exciting as a new and innovative legal sex
discrimination theory, advocates should not forget about the
traditional advocacy techniques relied upon prior to the enactment
of Section 1161.3. A simple letter or phone call to a landlord can
prove to be very effective when negotiating a housing issue on
behalf of a client.196 A landlord may be nervous about litigation, and
may be more than willing to compromise with an advocate to find a
way to keep a victim in her home. Advocates may attempt to
"embarrass" a landlord into legal and moral behavior by contacting
local media outlets and asking them to air or publish the victim's
story.197 Advocates should consider whether a victim has a valid
claim under another theory, such as disability accommodation laws,
or sexual harassment, or another section of FEHA or FIA.198
The strategy implemented will depend on the victim's
particular situation. It is also important to remember that the
victim's safety and that of her children is always the priority. Even if
legal action can be taken to keep the victim in her home, her safety
may be better served if advocates help her relocate. Moreover, a
victim may not want to continue to live under a landlord who
attempts to evict her. It is important to acknowledge that any statute
that addresses domestic violence will add additional protection for
victims. Section 1161.3 may provide protection in that landlords
may realize that the law prohibits them from evicting tenants based
on an act of abuse. Landlords may choose to work with victims to
solve problems because they do not want to break the law, or do not
want to face litigation that could result from the eviction. However,
it is important for advocates and victims not to become
overconfident about the protections that Section 1161.3 appears to
provide without considering all of these possible actions.
196. SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61, at 50.
197. Id. at 82.
198. Id. at 50.
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CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a pervasive and insidious social problem
that affects millions of women each year.199 Victims of domestic
violence are commonly evicted from their rental housing because of
violence against them in their homes, and are often vulnerable to
homelessness. 200 Legal responses and official victim advocacy has
improved over the past several decades, but there are still dangerous
myths surrounding this issue.201 Many legal professionals, including
judges, often do not understand why a victim does not simply leave
her abuser and become frustrated when the victim continuously
returns to her batterer.202 This frustration is often reflected in laws
that are passed with the intention of providing victim protection.
The California legislature passed Section 1161.3 in January, 2011, and
prohibits landlords from evicting a victim because of an incident of
violence against her.2 03 This is a positive step forward, but should
not be relied upon as the definitive solution to evictions resulting
from domestic violence. Advocates should continue to develop legal
strategies that will keep victims from being evicted, and engage in
traditional advocacy. 204
Any legislative response is a welcome progression towards the
recognition that domestic violence is a serious social problem, and
that domestic violence victims are in need of protection. However,
no single piece of legislation is going to be the solution, and
advocates should be aware that Section 1161.3 may not solve
housing issues for all victims. Advocates should continue to serve
victims, keep their safety the top priority, and use traditional
advocacy strategies. Section 1161.3 complements these tools, but it
does not replace them.
199. Nath, supra note 3.
200. See generally U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 4; Hirst, supra note 8, at
132-33.
201. See Griffith, supra note 33.
202. See generally WALKER, supra note 55.
203. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161.3(a) (West 2011).
204. See generally SCHULTZMAN, supra note 61.
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